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Global Resilience Analysis of Water Distribution Systems 1 
Kegong Diao12, Chris Sweetapple3, Raziyeh Farmani4, Guangtao Fu5, Sarah Ward6, David 2 
Butler7 3 
ABSTRACT 4 
Evaluating and enhancing resilience in water infrastructure is a crucial step towards more 5 
sustainable urban water management. As a prerequisite to enhancing resilience, a detailed 6 
understanding is required of the inherent resilience of the underlying system. Differing from 7 
traditional risk analysis, here we propose a global resilience analysis (GRA) approach that 8 
shifts the objective from analysing multiple and unknown threats to analysing the more 9 
identifiable and measurable system responses to extreme conditions, i.e. potential failure 10 
modes. GRA aims to evaluate a system’s resilience to a possible failure mode regardless of 11 
the causal threat(s) (known or unknown, external or internal). The method is applied to test 12 
the resilience of four water distribution systems (WDSs) with various features to three typical 13 
failure modes (pipe failure, excess demand, and substance intrusion). The study reveals GRA 14 
provides an overview of a water system’s resilience to various failure modes. For each failure 15 
mode, it identifies the range of corresponding failure impacts and reveals extreme scenarios 16 
(e.g. the complete loss of water supply with only 5% pipe failure, or still meeting 80% of 17 
demand despite over 70% of pipes failing).GRA also reveals that increased resilience to one 18 
failure mode may decrease resilience to another and increasing system capacity may delay 19 
the system’s recovery in some situations. It is also shown that selecting an appropriate level 20 
                                                          
1
 Associate Research Fellow (07/2013-03/2016), Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, 
EX4 4QF, UK.(corresponding author). E-mail: k.diao@exeter.ac.uk 
2Lecturer in engineering and sustainable development (04/2016-present), Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, 
Mill Lane, Leicester, LE2 7DR, UK (corresponding author). Email: kegong.diao@dmu.ac.uk 
3Associate Research Fellow, Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, EX4 4QF, 
UK.(corresponding author). E-mail: C.Sweetapple@exeter.ac.uk 
4Senior Lecturer, Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK. E-mail: 
R.Farmani@exeter.ac.uk 
5Senior Lecturer, Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK. E-mail: 
G.Fu@exeter.ac.uk 
6Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK. E-mail: 
sarah.ward@exeter.ac.uk 
7Professor, Centre for Water Systems, University of Exeter, North Park Rd, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK. E-mail: 
D.Butler@exeter.ac.uk 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
2 
 
of detail for hydraulic models is of great importance in resilience analysis. The method can be 21 
used as a comprehensive diagnostic framework to evaluate a range of interventions for 22 
improving system resilience in future studies. 23 
Keywords: excess demand, failure mode, global resilience analysis, pipe failure, substance 24 
intrusion, water distribution system 25 
 26 
1. INTRODUCTION 27 
There is an emerging realisation that building resilience is an important component of 28 
enhancing the sustainability of many systems, including water systems (Ahern, 2011; Pickett 29 
et al, 2014).  Engineering resilience can be broadly characterised in two related but distinct 30 
ways: attribute-based and performance-based.  The former typically concerns the system as a 31 
whole and could be considered as a set of design principles, such as the degree of 32 
interconnectedness or duplication, which enables the system to respond appropriately to any 33 
threat.  The latter refers to the agreed performance of the system (or part of the system) in 34 
responding to a particular threat. It is therefore typically prescriptive (i.e. standard-based) and 35 
refers to an operational goal (Butler et al., 2014).  The degree to which the various attributes 36 
of a system build the standard of performance required is still a matter of on-going research 37 
but this requires a detailed understanding of whole-system resilience. 38 
 39 
In this paper, emphasis is placed on understanding the performance of water systems under 40 
unexpected or deteriorating conditions (beyond failure) and resilience is defined here as the 41 
degree to which the system minimizes level of service failure magnitude and duration over its 42 
design life when subject to exceptional conditions (Butler et al, 2014).  This definition is 43 
broadly in line with emerging policy and practice (NIAC, 2009; Ofwat, 2012).  As a 44 
prerequisite to enhancing resilience, a detailed understanding is required of the inherent 45 
resilience of the underlying system and that is the focus of this paper. 46 
 47 
There area number of key challenges to overcome when evaluating system resilience: 48 
• How to link threat to impact 49 
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• How to deal with different threats that produce the same impact 50 
• How to deal with similar threats that produce different impacts 51 
• How to envisage all possible threats that may affect the system 52 
• How to handle unknown threats. 53 
Risk analysis (e.g. all-hazards approach, ASCE Policy Statement 518, 2006; NIAC, 2009; 54 
Cabinet Office, 2011) is a typical method to study threat-impact relationships, but is unable to 55 
address unknown threats (Hughes and Healy, 2014). A promising way to overcome this 56 
problem is to focus on the system, and direct attention to all possible failure modes rather 57 
than speculate on all possible threats. Pipe failure in water distribution systems, for example, 58 
is a failure mode that may result from various internal (e.g. water hammer)or external 59 
threats(e.g. ground movement). Each failure mode may be considered a ‘stress’ on the system 60 
which results in performance ‘strains’ (Johansson 2007; Hokstad et al. 2013).Each failure 61 
mode encompasses multiple failure scenarios: in the example of the ‘pipe failure’ failure 62 
mode, for instance, failure scenarios would include every potential combination of pipe 63 
failures in the network. Each stress may also vary in magnitude – for example from 0% pipe 64 
failure to 100% pipe failure. Failure scenarios and their resulting performance strains 65 
(measured in terms of impact / level of service), therefore, can span from high probability, 66 
routine failures (such as a single pipe failure) to low (or even unknown) probability total 67 
failures. As threats with low probability (e.g. Canadian snow storm in 1998, North American 68 
blackout 2003, and earthquake followed by a tsunami in Japan 2011) do happen from time to 69 
time it is important to include these high stress scenarios when evaluating resilience 70 
(Johansson et al. 2013). With regard to events where the probability of a scenario is 71 
incalculable, this is precisely where a ‘resilience’ approach is of greatest benefit – risk cannot 72 
be calculated but that does not mean that such occurrences should be ignored, and resilience 73 
assessment provides a tool by which they can be considered. Identification of failure modes, 74 
failure scenarios and stress magnitudes requires no knowledge of the causal threat or threats. 75 
The full range of performance strains resulting from any stress magnitude can, therefore be 76 
evaluated even when there are unknown threats. 77 
 78 
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This type of approach has been adopted as part of the global vulnerability analysis (GVA) 79 
method, used to assess the vulnerability of power grids and water distribution systems 80 
(Johansson 2007; Johansson and Henrik, 2010; Johansson et al. 2013; Hokstad et al. 2013). 81 
For each failure mode, the method can identify: the range of strain magnitude (minimum and 82 
maximum) that can result from a given stress magnitude, the stress magnitude the system can 83 
withstand before reaching a certain level of service reduction and the existence of thresholds 84 
where a slight increase in stress gives rise to much more severe strains (Johansson 2007; 85 
Hokstad et al. 2013). In a similar way, Gheisi and Naser (2014) explored water distribution 86 
system (WDS) reliability in relation to pipe failure mode. In their study, the performance of 87 
alternative WDS layout designs was tested under an increasing number of simultaneous failed 88 
pipes. The corresponding strain frequency and magnitude was then measured. However, these 89 
previous studies did not model the recovery of the system from failure or measure the strain 90 
duration. Thus, these methods cannot be directly applied to comprehensively evaluate the 91 
resilience of WDSs. 92 
 93 
There have been a few attempts to identify the single failure mode scenarios to which the 94 
WDS is most vulnerable. Typically, these studies target identification of the minimum stress 95 
magnitude that results in the maximum strain, instead of focusing on an overview (e.g. 96 
identification of full range of strains at any given stress magnitude). For example, in terms of 97 
pipe failure, Berardi et al. (2014) applied an evolutionary algorithm to identify scenarios that 98 
have a minimum fraction of failed pipes, yet result in maximum shortage of water supply (e.g. 99 
isolation of connections to all water sources). For the same purpose, Kanta (2006), Bristow et 100 
al. (2007) and Kanta and Brum below (2013) studied pipe failure mode during fire fighting 101 
and identified its maximum strain.  102 
 103 
This paper proposes a method that builds on GVA, called global resilience analysis (GRA), 104 
which is designed to assess the whole-system resilience of engineering systems.GRA is 105 
applied in this paper to WDSs and in a complementary paper to urban drainage systems 106 
(Mugume et al. 2015). GRA resilience analysis of a water distribution system has not been 107 
attempted before. As such, this study addresses potential large magnitude system failures 108 
which have not been captured in any previous analysis, in addition to the lower magnitude/ 109 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
5 
 
higher probability events already studied. Of course, high stress scenarios are highly 110 
improbable and it is likely that decision makers will focus on the lower magnitude/higher 111 
probability events. However, there are examples of low probability, high consequences 112 
events in water distribution systems, e.g. a large number of pipe failures following a number 113 
of days below zero temperature or an earthquake. Hence, we cannot be blind to the fact that 114 
extreme events can occur, and this study evaluates the maximum theoretical level of service 115 
that may be maintained in such instances. There may also be scenarios in which failure of 116 
additional components results in no further impact. Therefore, to achieve a comprehensive 117 
view, it is important to consider as many scenarios as possible. GRA has been attempted in 118 
the context of urban drainage (Mugume et al., 2015) but this study includes specific 119 
consideration to both structural and functional failures (see below for definitions of these). 120 
Moreover, this study applies an improved failure scenario sampling technique which includes 121 
targeted failures in addition to the random failures. This enriches the sample and increases the 122 
capture of critical scenarios, particularly those resulting in distinctive high and low strains. In 123 
contrast to the methods reviewed above, GRA measures both strain (level of service) 124 
magnitude and duration under stresses, allowing a comprehensive picture of system resilience 125 
to be built up. Failure scenarios over extended periods (Francis and Bekera, 2014) are 126 
modelled for the failure mode. Metrics are based on model simulation results rather than 127 
graph theory, as is the case in GVA. This paper describes the GRA method developed and its 128 
application to four different case studies. Three different failure modes are considered and 129 
resilience curves built, compared and contrasted. 130 
 131 
2. METHOD 132 
2.1 Global Resilience Analysis 133 
A system’s inherent resilience is evaluated by modelling the basic failure modes with 134 
increasing stress magnitude and estimating the corresponding strains that arise (Johansson 135 
2007, Hokstad et al. 2013). The method includes the following steps: 136 
Step 1. Identify the failure mode to be considered (e.g. structural failure, excess demand); this 137 
study selects three WDS failure modes, of which details are provided in subsection “Failure 138 
modes selected”. 139 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
6 
 
 140 
Step2. Identify the system stress associated with the failure mode and the way to simulate 141 
it(e.g. WDS simulation with excess load at a node for a specified period); 142 
 143 
Step 3. Identify the appropriate system strain and how to measure it (e.g. ratio of unsupplied 144 
demand to the total demand required in the strain duration); 145 
 146 
Step 4. Simulate failure mode strains under increasing stress magnitude (0%-100%of 147 
maximum stress). Whilst extreme stress magnitudes of up to 100% may be highly improbable, 148 
they are theoretically possible and must, therefore, be included if the full range of potential 149 
impacts is to be identified. For any given stress magnitude, an appropriate number of failure 150 
scenarios is determined. This must be sufficient to reflect important variations in the analysis, 151 
but cannot include every possibility due to the huge number of possible failure scenarios. In 152 
this study, the number of failure scenarios is determined and samples generated as follows: 153 
 154 
Assume  is the total number of components and  the number of failed components (i.e. 155 
the magnitude of stress).If only one component in the system fails ( ), this may be any 156 
one of the total set of c components and the total number of potential scenarios is c. When all 157 
components fail ( ), there is only one possible scenario. 158 
 159 
Given  , two types of scenario are included in the sample development: random 160 
failure and targeted failure. Targeted failures are used to enrich the random sample and 161 
reduce the potential of missing critical scenarios, particularly those resulting indistinctive 162 
c fc
1=fc
cc f =
cc f <<1
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
7 
 
high and low strains. The random failure scenario picks all locations of the  failed 163 
components randomly, and each scenario is unique. Simulation of the random failure 164 
scenarios is repeated  times, where is determined as follows (Brase and Brase, 2012): 165 
 166 
                                                   (1) 167 
                                                               (2) 168 
 169 
Here,  is the number of random failure scenarios modelled at each stress magnitude;   170 
is the total number of possible scenarios for a failure mode;  is the probability of success. 171 
In this study,  is regarded as the probability of successful hydraulic simulation since 172 
hydraulic simulation may fail under a large stress magnitude (i.e. scenarios with failed 173 
simulation are invalid and the strains are not calculated). A value of is assumed to 174 
provide the minimum sample size required.  is the confidence interval;  is the normal 175 
distribution value for a given confidence level (e.g. 1.645 at a confidence  level of 90%, 176 
1.960 at 95%, and 2.575 at 99%. 177 
 178 
The targeted failure scenarios where are built up incrementally by selecting  179 
failed components one by one (Albert et al., 2000; Holme and Kim, 2002; He et al., 2009). 180 
Two different selection strategies are applied, resulting in two groups of targeted failure 181 
scenarios with an equal number of scenarios. One group is started by first selecting the 182 
fc
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individual component whose failure results in the greatest strain, and vice versa for the other 183 
group (i.e. select the component resulting in lowest). If there are multiple components 184 
causing the same level of strain, or no component causing any strain, one is randomly 185 
selected (He et al., 2009). At each subsequent selection (e.g. the th), failed 186 
components have been already selected, and only one more component (i.e. the  failed 187 
component) is selected from remaining unselected components {i.e. }. Hence, to 188 
consider all possible locations of the  failed component, the total number of targeted 189 
failure scenarios ( ) should be  at any given number of ( )failed 190 
components. As a complementary method to random failure, the targeted failure scenarios 191 
have been widely used in complex network science for exploring the resilience and/or 192 
robustness of the networks to failures at specific locations, e.g. target attack (Albert et al., 193 
2000; Holme and Kim, 2002; He et al., 2009). 194 
 195 
The total number of failure scenarios for evaluation is therefore , where is 196 
the total number of scenarios with only one component failed ( );  the number 197 
of scenarios with more than one but less than all components failed( ); and 1 the 198 
number of scenarios with all components failed( ). 199 
 200 
As an example, consider the resilience of a WDS with 428 pipes to the pipe failure mode (i.e. 201 
). The number of failure scenarios should be calculated for all possible magnitudes of 202 
stress, from a single pipe failure( ) to failure of every pipe ( ). There are203 
 ( )possible single pipe failure scenarios, and one scenario when all pipes fail. 204 
fc ( )1−fc
thfc
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 205 
When , the number of scenarios is the sum of random failure scenarios  and 206 
targeted failure scenarios ( ). The number of random failure scenarios  required is 207 
calculated as follows for , , and =1.960 for a confidence level of 95%: 208 
 209 
 210 
 211 
The number of targeted failure scenarios is , i.e. 854 for , 852 212 
for , etc. Therefore, .  213 
 214 
To sum up, the number of scenarios encompassing all stress magnitudes is: 215 
 216 
and the total number of scenarios is therefore . 217 
 218 
Step 5. Generate a resilience stress-strain curves howing the mean, maximum and minimum 219 
strains generated from the simulations for any given stress magnitude. 220 
 221 
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2.2 Failure modes selected 222 
Failure modes in WDSs can be broadly categorised as either: (a) a structural failure, which 223 
results from malfunction of system components, or (b) a functional failure, where the 224 
emphasis is on system resilience under loading conditions beyond the design envelope 225 
(Mugume et al., 2015).  In this work, three different failure modes are considered in order to 226 
evaluate WDS resilience from differing perspectives. These are pipe failure, excess demand, 227 
and substance intrusion. Reponses to systematic pipe failure can reveal the resilience of the 228 
system to the loss of physical connectivity (structural). Responses to excess demand indicate 229 
resilience to additional point loads without structural failure (functional). Responses to 230 
substance intrusion reflect resilience of the system to water quality disturbance without a 231 
change of system structure or hydraulic loading. Hence, WDS resilience is comprehensively 232 
evaluated in terms of structure and function. For each case, the specific evaluation method is 233 
described. Investigating different failure modes individually helps us to distinguish the 234 
systems’ dynamic response to specific failures. This is critical before moving to more 235 
complicated cases. Evaluation of multiple, simultaneous system failure modes (e.g. pipe 236 
failure and loss of power) is beyond the scope of this particular paper but a topic of further, 237 
ongoing research. 238 
 239 
2.2.1 Pipe failure 240 
In this failure mode, the stress is modelled by changing the status of pipes to completely 241 
closed for a duration of 3 hours. This is an attempt to simulate the isolation of failed 242 
pipes(loss of connectivity) followed by repair within three hours (i.e. the typical no-penalty 243 
maximum response time for UK water service providers). The simulation is a simplification 244 
of a real pipe failure and does not include the process from occurrence of pipe failure (e.g. 245 
pipe burst) to detection and complete isolation. Thus, water loss before pipe isolation is not 246 
modelled. Failed pipes are considered as isolatable shortly after breakage, and hence the ‘pipe 247 
failure’ has been modelled by closing the pipes rather than opening them and allowing 248 
outflows to drain into the surroundings until tanks are emptied. The stress magnitude is the 249 
percentage of pipes failed, represented by red crosses in Figure 1. Although pipe bursts 250 
typically occur during periods of low demand, pipe failure may result from a range of internal 251 
and external threats and can potentially occur at any time. In the simulation, pipe failure is, 252 
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therefore, introduced to coincide with the peak demand period and so capture the maximum 253 
potential impact. The strain magnitude is assessed by calculating , the ratio of unsupplied 254 
demand to the total demand during strain duration (Eq.3 and 4). The strain duration is the 255 
time between the first occurrence of supply failure and the final return to a non-failure mode. 256 
Time to strain is also measured, and is the time between the first application of the stress (i.e. 257 
start of pipe failure) and the first occurrence of supply failure resulting from the stress. For 258 
cases when a given magnitude of stress causes no strain, time to strain is not calculated.  259 
 260 
(3) 261 
(4) 262 
 263 
where — the expected nodal demand to supply at junction  at time ; —  the 264 
actual pressure at junction  at time ; —  the minimum allowed pressure at junction  265 
(20 m for nodes with demand, and 0 m for nodes without); — the estimated actual 266 
supplied nodal demand at junction  at time  when there is no pipe failure; — the 267 
estimated actual nodal demand at junction  at time in failure scenario ; — start time 268 
of the strain; — end time of the strain; — the total number of junctions. 269 
 270 
fdD
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )[ ]










>=
<<
<=
=
2/1
min
min
min )(
:
:0
0:0
PtPtd
tdPtP
PtP
tP
tq ii
ii
i
i
i
( ) ( )( ) ( )∑ ∑∑ ∑ −= SE
SS
SE
SS
T
T
N
i i
T
T
N
i fiif tqtqtqdD ,
)(td i i t ( )tPi
i t minP i
( )tqi
i t ( )tq fi ,
i t f SST
SET N
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
12 
 
 271 
Figure 1. Schematic of the three failure modes and corresponding failure scenarios. Crosses, 272 
flames and arrows represent the location of pipe failures, increased demands and substance 273 
intrusions respectively. 274 
 275 
2.2.2 Excess demand – fire fighting 276 
This failure mode represents the effects of incrementally loading the WDS with excess nodal 277 
demands, above and beyond the nominal loading case. The stress is simulated by adding 278 
excess demands with specified magnitude and duration, such as those that might be 279 
experienced under fire fighting conditions, to nodes, (as illustrated by flames in Figure 1). To 280 
enable comparison of the systems’ resilience on a like-for-like basis, the stress is a 6 hour 281 
duration fire flow of 26.67 L/s (ÖNORM B 2538, 2002) (equivalent to 422.73 US 282 
gallon/minute)for all systems, irrespective of the system’s design criteria. The percentage of 283 
nodes subject to this additional demand represents the stress magnitude. The introduction of 284 
the demand is timed to coincide with the normal peak demand period.  Whilst it is recognised 285 
that occurrence of fires may reduce normal demand, this is not guaranteed and the 286 
assumption of normal demand enables identification of critical scenarios. For example, a 100% 287 
stress magnitude does not necessarily mean that the whole city is ablaze: there may be several 288 
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large fires which necessitate the use of every hydrant but normal demands still occur in 289 
unaffected areas. 290 
 291 
The strain magnitude is assessed by calculating the ratio of the mean number of nodes with 292 
pressure deficiency at any time step during the strain duration to the total number of nodes. 293 
For nodes with demand, the pressure is regarded as insufficient if it is <17m(ÖNORM B 294 
2538, 2002) during fire fighting or <20m (Marchi et al., 2014; Giustolisi et al., 2015) after 295 
fire fighting. For nodes without demand, the pressure is regarded as insufficient if it is ≤0 m 296 
(Marchi et al., 2014; Giustolisi et al., 2015). The strain duration is the time between first 297 
occurrence of insufficient node pressure resulting from the stress and the final recovery to 298 
sufficient pressure at all nodes. Time to strain is the time from when fire fighting starts to 299 
occurrence of first pressure deficiency caused by the stress. 300 
 301 
2.2.3 Substance intrusion 302 
This stress is simulated by imposing a 25 g substance mass booster source at individual nodes 303 
for a duration of 2 hours from the beginning of the simulation period (Zechman, 2011). Water 304 
supply is regarded as uncontaminated when a substance concentration is compliant with EU 305 
drinking water quality standards A threshold of < 250 mg/L is used as applied to common 306 
substances such as chloride and sulphate[European Union (Drinking Water) Regulations 307 
2014].The specific substance mass was chosen in order to 1) represent a substantial water 308 
quality deterioration violating the EU standard (i.e. 10 times the threshold value at source); 2) 309 
expose differences among systems and 3) avoid extensive computational load (high mass 310 
requires much longer simulation times as the system recovers much more slowly). The stress 311 
magnitude is modelled by the percentage of nodes to which an intrusion source is 312 
administered, represented by arrows in Figure 1. The strain magnitude is evaluated by 313 
calculating the ratio of the volume of non-compliant water supply to the total water supply 314 
volume in strain duration. The strain duration is the time from first occurrence of non-315 
compliant water supply until all water supplies in the system completely satisfies the 316 
threshold. In this study the intrusion is assumed to be undetected, and hence no emergency 317 
controls that may speed up recovery of the systems, are modelled. Hence, recovery of the 318 
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systems depends solely on the system properties. Time to strain is the time from when 319 
substance intrusion starts to occurrence of contaminated supply. 320 
 321 
A computer program was developed in C# to implement the GRA method for the three 322 
failure modes. The program generates failure mode scenarios by adding stresses in a WDS 323 
model through editing the model’s input file. It then calls the EPANET engine (Rossman, 324 
2000) for hydraulic and water quality simulation (demand-driven) of the scenarios. Based on 325 
simulation results, strain magnitude and duration are measured. Note that scenarios in which 326 
EPANET cannot solve the hydraulic equations (e.g. due to ill-conditioned equation systems) 327 
are omitted from the results plots. Analysis shows that these scenarios can be significantly 328 
different and do not result from failure of a group of critical elements. Hence, this is a 329 
weakness of the current numerical computation technique we used, and improving the 330 
fundamental hydraulic calculation scheme is out of the scope of this study. A pressure-driven 331 
model was also trialled but eventually discarded due to issues of convergence failure. 332 
 333 
In the EPANET simulation, default settings are used (e.g. head-loss formula, hydraulic time 334 
step) for hydraulic computation of all simulated WDSs. For the water quality simulation, the 335 
transport and decay of substances is modelled based on the principles of conservation of mass 336 
coupled with reaction kinetics (Rossman et al., 1993; Rossman and Boulos, 1996).The chosen 337 
settings for substance reaction in EPANET are: Bulk Reaction Order = 1.0; Global Bulk 338 
Coefficient = -1.0 (Rossman, 2000). Due to the high computational load of the water quality 339 
analysis, the maximum allowable water quality time step is used, i.e. the same as the demand 340 
pattern time step (e.g. 30 minutes or 1 hour, depending on the model used). 341 
 342 
3. CASE STUDIES 343 
Four WDSs of different sizes and configurations were used as case studies and their 344 
properties and configurations are summarised in Figure 2 and Table 1.The case study 345 
networks have been used as benchmarks for WDS studies on water quality (Ostfeld et al., 346 
2008), calibration (Ostfeld et al., 2012), optimal design (Marchi et al., 2014; Giustolisi et al., 347 
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2015), and cascade failures (Sitzenfrei et al. 2011; Diao et al., 2014a).No modifications were 348 
made to the properties of the networks. 349 
 350 
 351 
Figure 2. Case study water distribution systems 352 
 353 
Table 1General properties of the case study networks 354 
Networks Net 3 Alpine BWSN1 C-Town 
No. of Nodes 91 127 126 388 
No. of Links 115 157 168 429 
No. of Reservoirs 2 2 1 1 
No. of Tanks 3 4 2 7 
No. of Pump stations 2 3 2 5 
Simulation duration (hrs) 24 75 96 168 
System mean demand 
(L/s) 717.3 6.36 56.37 170.16 
Total tank volume (L) 28,621,000 732,358 35,148,000 9,496,639 
 355 
 356 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 357 
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This section illustrates the GRA results and discusses how they can contribute to the 358 
management and operation of water distribution systems. Each failure mode is first analysed 359 
individually and then the common features are explored. 360 
 361 
The GRA results for the three failure modes are presented in Figures 3–5, showing the 362 
magnitude of stress applied against the magnitude of strain on the system. The plots show the 363 
mean (dash dot), maximum (solid) and minimum (dash) relationships between stress and 364 
strain. 365 
 366 
4.1 Pipe failure 367 
In the case of pipe failure, the GRA curves (Figure 3) indicate that the worst case WDS 368 
response to pipe failure is complete loss of water supply in all of the case study WDSs. Strain 369 
duration is either the same as the duration of pipe failure (i.e. 3 hrs) or slightly longer (e.g. 1 370 
hr more). Time to strain (level of service failure) ranges from 0 hr to 2 hrs. Thus, all four 371 
systems currently lack resilience to this failure mode, and the strain starts and stops 372 
immediately or shortly after pipe failure starts and ends, respectively. Specifically, the 373 
maximum strain curves of all systems (the solid lines in Figure 3) rise sharply to reach the 374 
global maximum supply shortage (100%). Hence, failure of just a small fraction of pipes 375 
(approx. 6% for Net3; 5% for BWSN network 1; 29% for the Alpine network; and 25% for 376 
C-Town) can disrupt the systems’ water supply entirely. 377 
 378 
The results imply that, in each system, only a few pipes represent the most critical hydraulic 379 
links, e.g. trunks connecting reservoirs to the rest of the system. For instance, duplication of 380 
only 9 pipes [Figure 4(A)] can dramatically increase the resilience of Alpine network to low 381 
stress yet high probability events [Figure 4(B)]. These pipes are chosen via clustering 382 
analysis, as described by Diao et al., (2014a). Contrarily, failure of a large number of pipes 383 
does not necessarily result in catastrophic impacts. For instance, Net3 can still deliver 86% of 384 
total demand with 70% of pipes failed if critical pipes remain undamaged (shown in Figure 3). 385 
The revealed criticality of pipes can guide investments in operation and maintenance and 386 
emergency planning (e.g. for pipe burst). Critical pipes are prioritized for protection. 387 
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Uncritical pipes may be ideal sites for operation and maintenance control due to the low 388 
impact of disconnecting them. For example, those pipes can be closed to isolate a burst pipe 389 
nearby in emergency planning. Therefore, they can be ideal places to install isolation valves. 390 
As a result, the system can fail as planned to minimize the impacts. Based on the results, 391 
budget for increasing resilience to pipe failure can therefore be efficiently allocated. 392 
 393 
Note that the analysis results may also be affected by the level of detail of the hydraulic 394 
models. Alpine and C-Town, for instance, reaches the maximum impact under a relatively 395 
large stress magnitude (29% and 25% respectively) in comparison with Net3 and BWSN 396 
network 1 (6% and 5%).This may be attributed partially to the greater detail in the Alpine and 397 
C-Town models. These two networks have a mean pipe length of 130m (max 1600m), 398 
compared with 562m (max 3127m) for Net3 and 224m (max 13868m) for BWSN Network 1. 399 
Consequently, failure of a pipe in Net3 or BWSN Network 1 may actually represent loss of 400 
an entire supply path. Loss of all connections in a trunk model does not necessarily mean 401 
failure of every individual pipe – instead, it represents loss of all paths to water sources due to 402 
failure of any pipes on those paths. Furthermore, increased model detail may lead to a larger 403 
number of possible scenarios, which in turn increases the difficulty of finding the most 404 
extreme scenarios. In this regard, it may be worthwhile starting the GRA with a trunk model, 405 
and then changing to detailed model (e.g. all-pipe model) if necessary (e.g. for detailed 406 
analysis of parts of the system found to be critical). 407 
 408 
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 409 
Figure 3. GRA curves for pipe failure 410 
 411 
 412 
Figure 4. Enhancement of the Alpine network resilienceto pipe failure by twinning critical 413 
pipes 414 
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 415 
4.2 Excess demandüfirefighting 416 
As shown in Figure 5, the basic level of service (i.e. nodal pressures <17 m during 417 
firefighting and < 20 m after) is breached for all the WDSs, although this occurs at various 418 
fractions of nodal coverage and has widely different strain durations starting at different 419 
times after the commencement of firefighting. Indeed, the systems each have very different 420 
response curves to these excess nodal demands. 421 
 422 
The strain magnitude of Net3remains near zero(i.e. no or marginal level of service drop) until 423 
a large stress magnitude (number of fire fighting nodes) is imposed (i.e. 22% for maximum; 424 
42% for mean; 68% for minimum), and so is considered highly resilient. Beyond this 425 
threshold, the lines then increase gradually and converge to a 65% loss of service when all 426 
nodes are stressed. The strain duration is no longer than 6 hrs, i.e. the duration of the fire 427 
fighting stress, and there is no strain when the magnitude of fire fighting stress is below 6%. 428 
Clearly, Net3 has a large buffer capacity to meet fire fighting demands that are relatively 429 
small with regard to the high demands of the system, e.g. system mean demand = 717.3 L/s. 430 
Quantifying the buffer capacity will also facilitate evaluation of the ability of WDSs to 431 
handle any demand uncertainties. With the exception of cases in which there is no strain (i.e. 432 
time to strain does not exist), the time to strain is either 2 or 0 hrs. 433 
 434 
The BWSN network1 is also resilient to fire fighting stress, with a service drop threshold at 435 
22%for max; 23% for mean; 55% for min. In contrast, the BWSN network1 has a much 436 
longer maximum strain duration (24 hrs) than Net3 (2 hrs), whilst it can absorb a much larger 437 
magnitude of fire fighting stress (16%) without any strain. Again, for scenarios with strains, 438 
the maximum time to strain of BWSN network1 is as long as 6 hours, while that of Net3is 439 
only 2 hrs [Figure 5] when the stress magnitude falls between 17% and 47%. However, strain 440 
in BWSN network1 begins earlier (maximum time to strain = 0 hrs) than in Net3 (maximum 441 
time to strain = 2 hrs) for a larger magnitude of fire fighting stress afterwards. Given these 442 
comparisons, it can be concluded that even for the same failure mode, a system can be more 443 
resilient than another with respect to one measure of strain and less resilient with respect to 444 
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another. Even for the same measure of strain, a system can be more resilient than another 445 
under only a certain range of stress magnitudes and vice versa. These facts demonstrate the 446 
necessity of GRA, showing that analysis of a few scenarios which address only a limited 447 
range of potential stress magnitudes and types may not reveal the full dynamic of a system’s 448 
response and tipping points. 449 
 450 
Alpine and C-Town have low or even no buffer capacity to widespread excess demands, 451 
exhibiting rapid increases in strain over approximately the first 10% of stress. 452 
Correspondingly, the strain duration increases sharply to maxima (i.e. 7 and 17 hrs for Alpine 453 
and C-Town respectively) at only 2% (Alpine) and 5% (C-Town) node coverage. 454 
Nevertheless, the time to strain of the two systems has a large range as well, although they 455 
cannot absorb any magnitude of fire fighting stress with no strain. For example, in some 456 
cases the strain on C-Town does not occur until 83 hrs (Figure 4) after the stress was imposed. 457 
 458 
The exceptionally long strain durations in BWSN and C-Town are attributed to the long 459 
recovery time of only a few nodes. The long-lasting pressure deficiencies at those nodes 460 
result from drained tanks and lack of pumping capacity (e.g. to refill the tanks quickly).This 461 
is understandable as the WDSs are not sized to cope with exceptional high impact failures. 462 
However, this also implies that increasing capacity may not necessarily enhance resilience, 463 
since dramatically increased capacity (e.g. tank size) may still be too small to reduce impacts 464 
of high stress, and worse prolong the recovery time significantly after removal of the stress 465 
(e.g. due to the longer time taken to refill large tanks). Furthermore, increased hydraulic 466 
capacity may have negative effects on water quality and this should be fully explored before 467 
implementing such interventions to increase resilience to excess demand. Hence, increase of 468 
capacity should be very carefully planned. To shorten recovery time, more operational 469 
options (e.g. more available pumps to increase pumping capacity) would be more feasible 470 
and cost-efficient as emergent post-stress responses. For instance, by adding one pump at the 471 
water source in BWSN Network 1 (with the same property as the original one, PUMP-472 
172)[Figure 6(A)] and running it for 5 hours (hours 38-43) after fire-fighting, the maximum 473 
strain duration is reduced by 12 hours [Figure 6(B)]. This indicates that a guideline for 474 
resilient design of WDSs is definitely required, since such an extra pump would not be 475 
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regarded as necessary if failure scenarios were not considered. This also demonstrates that 476 
assessing resilience enhancement due to implementation of different interventions should 477 
include properties and performance. 478 
 479 
For this failure mode, the level of model detail may also affect the analysis and results. In 480 
less-detailed models, many locations of hydrants maybe missing and therefore use of multiple 481 
nearby hydrants for fire-fighting cannot be modelled. In all pipe models, nodes configured 482 
with hydrants should be identified as it may not appropriate to assume a hydrant is available 483 
at every node. Hence, the appropriate level of model detail is an area for future exploration, 484 
and knowledge of all hydrant locations is a prerequisite. 485 
 486 
 487 
Figure 5. GRA curves for excess demand (firefighting) 488 
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 489 
 490 
Figure 6. Shortened recovery of the BWSN following excess demand by increasing pumping 491 
capacity 492 
 493 
4.3 Substance intrusion 494 
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Figure 7 shows GRA curves for the four networks in response to substance intrusion events. 495 
For this failure mode, time to strain is regarded as 0 for all cases, as substanceintrusion starts 496 
at the very beginning of the model simulation. Hence, it is not included in Figure 7. 497 
 498 
There is variety in these curves indicating resilience to substance intrusion is very system 499 
specific. For instance, the maximum strain magnitude (i.e. percentage of contaminated water 500 
supply) ranges from 1.5% (Net3) to 100% (Alpine). The maximum strain duration ranges 501 
from 3 hrs (Net3) to 140 hrs (C-Town). Net3 is the most resilient to substance intrusion, 502 
followed by BWSN network1. The high flow rates due to large water demands in these two 503 
networks dilute the concentration of substance. As for the other two, C-Town has a lower 504 
maximum strain magnitude (57%) than Alpine (100%), but a longer maximum strain duration 505 
(140 hrs compared with 42 hrs). The large variation in strain durations may attributed to 506 
different reasons. For instance, the long strain duration of C-Town may be explained by the 507 
wide spread of tanks over the network, each of which needs a long time to recover once 508 
contaminated. Accordingly, the maximum strain duration of C-Town can be shortened to 100 509 
hrs by isolation of all tanks from the beginning of the intrusion until the system recovers. To 510 
meet the demands, however, the backup pump (PU3) at the water source needs to be switched 511 
on until the system recovers. 512 
 513 
As for water quality monitoring and control, the results provide some clues for sensor 514 
placement. For instance, the maximum impact in Alpine increases rapidly and exceeds80% 515 
contamination when the stress magnitude is only 6%. This indicates that a few nodes once 516 
polluted will have broad impact on the system. Hence, those nodes can be good candidates 517 
for sensor placement. Contrarily, the maximum impact in BWSN Network 1 and C-Town 518 
increases gradually, which is an indicator of good resilience. However, it reveals no node is 519 
significantly more important than any other for the studied substance intrusion. Consequently, 520 
more analysis (e.g. intrusion of different substances) may have to be done to identify suitable 521 
sites for sensors. 522 
 523 
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Regarding the level of model detail, models containing all pipes are required for accurate 524 
evaluation of resilience to substance intrusions, as it is unrealistic to model pollution of a 525 
pipeline  several thousand meters long (e.g. as in BWSN network 1) becoming polluted in 526 
one time-step. However, water quality simulation for such a detailed model could be very 527 
time consuming. A trade-off between accuracy and efficiency may be necessary, and 528 
therefore requires further future research. 529 
 530 
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Figure 7. GRA curves for substance intrusion 531 
 532 
4.4Common features 533 
For all the three failure modes, there were some common features:  534 
The range of strain magnitude first increased as stress magnitude increased and then reduced 535 
after the stress magnitude passed a threshold (different from system to system and failure 536 
mode to failure mode), finally converged when the whole WDSs were under stress. 537 
 538 
The same magnitude of stress could result in very different level of strains, as shown by the 539 
gap between maximum and minimum curves. For instance, the strain magnitude resulting 540 
from single pipe failure varies from 0% to about 40% in Net3 and BWSN network1, 0–15% 541 
in C-Town, and 0–10% in Alpine. Moreover, it ranges from nearly 0% to 100% when the 542 
fraction of pipes failed reaches 40% in Net3 and Alpine and 20% in BWSN network1; and 543 
from nearly 9% to 100% in C-Town with 10% of pipes failed. As discussed before, these big 544 
gaps reveal the existence of critical scenarios and the different levels of model detail. For 545 
instance, when 70% of pipes fail Net3 can be completely out of service (100% supply 546 
shortage) or still deliver about 86% of total demand, depending on the location of the failed 547 
pipes. The latter scenario meets the majority of demands with a tremendously high proportion 548 
of pipes failed because there is no pipe failure in the backbone (Diao et al., 2014b, 2015) 549 
formed by the most critical links connecting critical infrastructures (e.g. reservoirs, tanks, 550 
pump stations, large customers). Hence, enhancing the resilience of backbones to failure is 551 
crucial. For the other two failure modes, different combinations of failed components can 552 
lead to considerably varied strains as well. For the excess demand, the strain magnitude can 553 
range from 3.3% to 32% at a stress magnitude of 74% in Net3, and from 0% to 19% at a 554 
stress magnitude of 56% in BWSN network1, and from 46% to 90% at a stress magnitude of 555 
47% in Alpine. For the substance intrusion, the range of strain magnitude at a stress 556 
magnitude of 70% varies from 3.4% to 21.6% for BWSN network 1, from 53% to 100% for 557 
Alpine and from 13.5% to 57% for C-Town. 558 
 559 
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Increased resilience to one failure mode may decrease resilience for another. For instance, 560 
although tanks enhance flexibility and capacity to meet demand [e.g. as temporary water 561 
sources when the reservoir(s) is disconnected], they could be a negative factor regarding 562 
resilience to substance intrusion. This is demonstrated in C-Town, where the wide spread of 563 
several tanks can either prevent supply shortage resulting from pipe failure (i.e. give zero 564 
strain)or delay the occurrence of supply shortage (e.g. time to strain = 2, Figure 3).Contrarily, 565 
once those tanks are contaminated, the sparse spatial distribution of them may facilitate 566 
diffusion of contaminated water within the system, and results poor resilience to contaminant 567 
intrusion (as illustrated by the 140 hour recovery time in Figure 5). 568 
 569 
Additionally, given that this study investigates resilience to specific failure modes, it is 570 
expected that the results may differ from those obtained using other resilience indices. Whilst 571 
a comparison would be interesting, it is beyond the scope of this work. 572 
 573 
6. CONCLUSIONS 574 
This paper proposes a new method, global resilience analysis (GRA), and applies it to water 575 
distribution systems (WDSs). The GRA described evaluates the resilience off our benchmark 576 
systems to three different failure modes, those being pipe failure, excess demand (e.g. 577 
firefighting), and substance intrusion. A failure mode includes all scenarios of the system 578 
under a particular stress, regardless of what threat(s) causes the stress. The GRA results are 579 
presented in a series of plots which show the relationship between stress magnitude and 580 
multiple indicators of strain. From examination of the results of the GRA for each failure 581 
mode and WDS, it can be concluded that: 582 
 583 
1)GRA can identify: (i) the level of resilience of the same system to different failure modes; 584 
(ii) the level of resilience of different systems to the same failure mode; (iii) the range of 585 
strains (minimum and maximum) which may result from any given level of stress; (iv) the 586 
stress magnitude the system can withstand before reaching a certain level of service reduction; 587 
(v) the existence of thresholds where a slight increase in stress gives rise to more severe 588 
impacts; and (vi) scenarios which result in the minimum and maximum strains, which can 589 
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reveal combinations of components whose failure would lead to marginal or considerable 590 
strains. Therefore, this method can be used as comprehensive diagnostic framework linking 591 
system attributes (e.g. connectivity and capacity) to performance (e.g. level of service) to 592 
evaluate how best to build whole-system resilience based on multiple system failure modes in 593 
future studies. 594 
 595 
2)The GRA illustrates the similarities or differences in complex dynamic responses of 596 
different systems to various failure modes. For different failure modes, a system can be more 597 
resilient to one failure mode than another system while be less resilient to another failure 598 
mode. For the same failure mode, a system can be more resilient than another system with 599 
respect to one measure of strain and less resilient with respect to another. Even for the same 600 
measure of strain, a system can be more resilient than another under a certain range of stress 601 
magnitude and vice versa. 602 
 603 
3) The GRA results reveal that increased resilience to one failure mode may decrease 604 
resilience to another. For example, tanks enhance flexibility and capacity to meet 605 
demands[e.g. as temporary water sources when the reservoir(s) is disconnected], yet they 606 
could be a negative factor regarding resilience to substance intrusion (e.g. take very long time 607 
to recover once contaminated). 608 
 609 
4) Extreme scenarios identified (e.g. those with very high or low impacts) can guide 610 
resilience enhancement, and be used to ensure systems fail as planned during unexpected 611 
stresses. For instance, in some scenarios failure of a small number of critical components(e.g. 612 
5%) may disable the entire system for water supply, whilst in other scenarios 80% of demand 613 
may still be met when 70% of components have failed. Hence, different operation and 614 
maintenance strategies can be tailor-made for critical and uncritical components. 615 
 616 
5) Increasing capacity (e.g. by increasing tank size) may not always improve resilience, and 617 
may even prolong the system’s recovery time significantly following removal of the stress.It 618 
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is therefore necessary to assess both the properties and performance of any intervention 619 
designed to improve resilience. 620 
 621 
6) The level of detail of hydraulic models may affect the GRA results, and therefore the level 622 
of model detail required should be further explored for different failure modes. 623 
 624 
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Paper highlights 
·A method is developed to measure water systems’ resilience to various failure 
modes 
· The method identifies the range of failure impacts and reveals critical 
scenarios 
· Increased resilience to one failure mode may decrease resilience to another 
· Increasing capacity may not always improve resilience and may delay system 
recover 
· The same degree of failure can result in very different level of failure impacts 
